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Freedom of religion and democratic transition 
JAMES A. SWEENEY 
Introduction 
Article 9 of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) protects the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion. However the case law related to this right has 
only begun to develop quite recently, with the first judgment finding 
a violation of this article only delivered in 1993. ' Since then a rich and 
often controversial jurisprudence has begun to develop, ' including the 
two judgments on Turkish attempts to ban the wearing of Muslim head- 
scarves in certain higher education establishments, 3 the fallout from the 
publication of cartoons of the prophet Muhammad in Denmark in 2005, 
and the Grand Chamber's reversal of the judgment backing a challenge to 
the display of the Christian crucifix in Italian state schools. 4 No doubt the 
Swiss attempt to ban the construction of new minarets will also give rise 
to some thought-provoking argumentation. ' 
James Sweeney, Senior Lecturer in Law and Convenor of the `Law and Conflict at Durham' 
Research Group, Durham University, UK. An early version of this paper was presented at the 
Transitional Justice Institute, University of Ulster, on 23 March 2010. Thank you to the par- 
ticipants for their feedback. I would also like to show my appreciation for the undergraduate 
students on my Advanced Issues in Public Law class at Durham Law School in 2009/2010, 
on whom I tried out some of the ideas expressed in this paper and who responded with great 
aplomb and only occasional bafflement. 
' ECtHR, Kokkinakis v. Greece, 25 May 1993 (Appl. no. 14307/88). 
2 See C. Evans, Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Oxford University Press, 2001). 
ECtHR, Leyla $ahin v. Turkey [GC], 10 November 2005 (Appl. no. 44774/98) and discussed 
in K. Altiparmak and O. Karahanogullari, `After Sahin: The Debate on Headscarves is 
Not Over', European Constitutional Law Review 2 (2006) 268 and T. Lewis, `What Not to 
Wear: Religious Rights, the European Court, and the Margin of Appreciation', ICLQ 56 
(2007) 395 and D. McGoldrick, Human Rights and Religion: The Islamic Headscarf Debate 
in Europe (Oxford: Hart, 2006). 
ECtHR, Lautsi v. Italy, [GC], 18 March 2011 (Appl. no. 30814/06). 
BBC, `Swiss Minaret Appeal goes to European Court' (16.12.2009) available at: http: // 
news. bbc. co. uk/1/hi/8417076. stm. 
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This chapter questions the approach of the European Court of Human 
Rights to freedom of religion in transitional societies - to what will 
be 
termed `religion in transition' cases. The aim is to arrive at a legally sound 
and theoretically robust approach to these cases, which also fully respects 
the experiences of transitional democracies. In particular, the chapter 
examines the `margin of appreciation' left to Contracting Parties where 
the Respondent State cites the centrality of religion to the process of 
democratic transition as a reason for restricting some religious freedoms 
in favour of protecting others. The central argument of the chapter is that 
the European Court must take the transitional context seriously, without 
itself dispensing `transitional justice'. 
Freedom of religion is protected in all the other major international and 
regional human rights instruments, including Article 18 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 18 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 3 of the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (American Declaration), 
Article 12 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) and 
Article 8 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR). 
Throughout this chapter, some modest comparisons are made between 
the approach advocated to freedom of religion in the European system 
and these comparators. 6 
Democracy as a limit on restricting freedom of religion 
Article 9 ECHR protects freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
Articles 8-11 ECHR all enshrine rights in their first paragraph, and pro- 
vide for possible qualifications to the right in their second paragraph. 
The qualifications to Article 9 are slightly different to the other personal 
freedoms since they pertain only to the manifestation of religion or belief 
(the forum externum), rather than the act or state of believing itself (the 
forum internum). 
Interpreting the scope of Article 9(1) has been challenging and the 
European Commission's decision in Arrowsmith v. UK, ` that not all 
actions motivated by religious belief fall within it, ' has met with some 
For a more comprehensive comparison with the UN system see: P. M. Taylor, Freedom of 
Religion: UN and European Human Rights Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 
2005). 
EComHR, Arrowsmith v. UK, 16 May 1977 (Appl. no. 7050/75). 
Ibid., para. 71. 
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criticism. ' Many of the concerns about this case and its progeny are 
about identifying exactly which practices are, in fact, sufficiently moti- 
vated by religious or other beliefs to gain protection under Article 9(1). 
The key characteristic of Article 9 for our purposes is the extent to 
which the Court has recognised a strong link between religion and demo- 
cratic society. According to the Court: 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a 
democratic society within the meaning of the Convention. The pluralism 
indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over 
the centuries, depends on it. 10 
In this way, Article 9 will often need to be interpreted in the light of other 
Convention rights, such as the Article 11 right to freedom of association 
and peaceful assembly. " Thus, interferences with Article 9 rights may be 
examined not only as an impingement on the applicant's own religion 
or beliefs, but also as an indirect impingement on the democratic fabric 
of society. However, as we shall see in the next section, the relationship 
between religion and democracy cuts both ways. 
In order for a restriction upon Article 9 to be justified, it must meet the 
conditions specified in Article 9(2). The restriction must be prescribed 
by law and be necessary in a democratic society in the interest of public 
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the pro- 
tection of the rights and freedoms of others. These specified `interests' are 
more commonly referred to in the European jurisprudence as `legitimate 
aims'. 
At this stage it is important to note the approach of the other major 
international instruments to limiting freedom of religion. The argument 
below will hinge on the relationship between questions about the `legit- 
imacy' of restrictions and questions about their `necessity', since these are 
distinct stages in the European system. 
Article 18 of the UDHR does not contain a limitations clause but 
Article 29 states that: 
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to 
such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of secur- 
ing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and 
Evans, Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights, 115f. 
ECtHR, Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, 26 October 2000 (Appl. no. 30985/96) para. 60. 
" Ibid., para. 62. 
106 J. A. SWEENEY 
of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general 
welfare in a democratic society. 
Likewise Article 3 of the American Declaration does not contain a limi- 
tation clause, but all of the rights enumerated by it are subject to a general 
limitation clause in Article 28, which states that: 
The rights of man are limited by the rights of others, by the security of all, 
and by the just demands of the general welfare and the advancement of 
democracy. 
Both the UDHR and American Declaration thus recognise that any 
restriction must therefore pursue `just requirements' or `just demands' 
that, at least in the more specific formulation of the UDHR, are compar- 
able to the ECHR's `legitimate aims'. 
Article 18(3) ICCPR and Article 12(3) ACHR are almost identical in 
their formulation to Article 9(2) ECHR, so that restrictions must pursue 
specified legitimate aims as well as be necessary. '' 
The African system is slightly different in this regard. ' Article 8 
ACHPR consists of only one clause, which in its second sentence contains 
the guarantee that, `No one may, subject to law and order, be submitted 
to measures restricting the exercise of [freedom of religion]'. Article 27(2), 
in the section of the Charter on individual duties, states that, `The rights 
and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with due regard to the 
rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest'. The 
African Commission on Human Rights has held this to mean that: 
The reasons for possible limitations must be founded in a legitimate state 
interest and the evils of limitations of rights must be strictly propor- 
tionate with and absolutely necessary for the advantages which are to be 
obtained. 'a 
In this way, the African system likewise separates the issue of `legitimate 
state interest' from proportionality and necessity. 
On limitations to the ICCPR see: UN Commission on Human Rights, `"The Siracusa 
Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights', 28 September 1984, E/CN. 4/1985/4; the non-derogable 
nature of these rights is acknowledged and discussed below. 
See generally, A. Allo, `Derogations or Limitations? Rethinking the African Human 
Rights System of Derogation in Light of the European System', Ethiopian Journal of Legal 
Education 2(2) (2009) 21. 
14 AfComHPR, Media Rights Agenda and Others v. Nigeria, 1998 (no. 105/93,128/94,130/94 
and 152/96) vara. 69. 
FREEDOM OF RELIGION 107 
Restricting freedom of religion in order to 
promote democratic consolidation 
Religious questions run behind many significant cases brought before the 
European Court of Human Rights involving transitional issues, but which 
do not necessarily hinge on Article 9 itself. In these cases, as well some 
involving Article 9, the relationship between religion and democracy may 
be used instrumentally in order to justify rights-restrictive measures. 
A case in point would be the 2002 case of Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria. " This 
case involved the detention in Bulgaria and deportation to Syria of a state- 
less person of Muslim faith and Palestinian origin. The applicants in the 
case were Mr Al-Nashif and his two children, who remained in Bulgaria 
with their mother after their father's deportation. The European Court of 
Human Rights found violations of Articles 5(4), 8 and 13 ECHR. For our 
purposes, it is the argumentation on Article 8 that is interesting. 
This element of the case centred on whether Al-Nashif's deportation 
to Syria constituted an unjustified interference with his and his children's 
right to family life, since the family had no real connection with that state, 
and there were economic and legal impediments to establishing a fam- 
ily life in Syria or in neighbouring Jordan (where the children's maternal 
grandparents were living). The Bulgarian government denied, inter alia, 
that there was an interference with family life at all due to one crucial fact: 
whilst living in Bulgaria Al-Nashif had entered into a second, religious, 
marriage with another woman. '6 
The European Court took the approach that the existence of `family 
life' for the purposes of Article 8 is a question of fact. From the moment 
of their birth, children have a familial bond with their parents that only 
exceptional circumstances can change. '? The Court held that despite the 
first applicant entering into a second religious, concurrent, and thereby 
polygamous, marriage there were no exceptional circumstances such as 
to break the bond between the first applicant and his children. " 
This is undoubtedly an interesting case in terms of the apparent open- 
ness of the European Court to the suggestion that religious polygamous 
I.; ECtHR, Al-Nashit v. Bulgaria, 20 June 2002 (Appl. no. 50963/99). 
The government also argued that Al-Nashif had not proven that his first marriage was 
lawful (ibid., para. 107). One might argue that if polygamy was such a problem for the 
Bulgarian authorities, then questioning the validity of the `first' marriage would work 
against their central argument; that by marrying a second woman the applicant was 
showing he did not have a family life with the first. 
Ibid., para. 112. " Ibid., para. 113. 
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marriage does not necessarily disrupt family life as understood in the 
Convention sense. " To the extent that it involves one of the states that 
joined the Convention system after the end of the Cold War, it presents 
features that relate to the transitional issues discussed below: the gov- 
ernment had (unsuccessfully) argued that even if Article 8 applied to the 
case, the decision to deport Al-Nashif because of his alleged extremist 
activities was proportionate in the light of the Balkan regional context, 
where `measures of active protection of religious tolerance were critical 20 
and where in Bulgaria in particular, 
owing to a number of factors - such as disruptions in community trad- 
itions caused by decades of totalitarianism - the religious consciousness 
of the population was currently unstable and unsettled. Communities in 
general, and the Muslim community in particular, were therefore sus- 
ceptible to influences. It was necessary to protect them against Islamic 
fundamentalism. '' 
This passage illustrates that the real issue for the study of `religion in tran- 
sition' cases is the appearance of cases where the role of religion in the 
transitional context is cited as a justifying factor, pursuing a wider aim of 
democratic consolidation. 
Enlargement of the Council of Europe 
The early 1990s saw a massive enlargement of the Council of Europe, the 
parent organisation of the European Convention system. This, in turn, 
brought a great many new Contracting Parties to the ECHR. The wis- 
dom of the Council's rapid enlargement and the consequent extension of 
the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights is not univer- 
sally accepted. For example in 1993 Peter Leuprecht resigned as Deputy 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe, protesting that the standards 
of the Convention risked dilution with the admission of Russia into the 
This is particularly surprising given the European Court's now notorious assessment 
of Sharia law in the Refali Partisi case (discussed in a different context below), where it 
stated that, `sharia is incompatible with the fundamental principles of democracy, as set 
forth in the Convention' (ECtHR, Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) v. Turkey [GC), 13 
February 2003 (Appl. nos. 41340/98,41342/98,41343/98 and 41344/98) para. 123). For 
a critique of this judgment, see D. McGoldrick, `Accommodating Muslims in Europe: 
From Adopting Sharia Law to Religiously Based Opt Outs from Generally Applicable 
Laws', Human Rights Law Review 9(4) (2009) 603-612. 
Ibid., para. 111. ,' Ibid., para. 111. 
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Council. 222 Several academic commentators expressed similar concerns. 23 
Nevertheless, the Council of Europe took the view that participation in 
and supervision by the Convention system was better than exclusion 
from it. 24 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) offered 
the new Member States advice on the transitional process in the form of 
Resolution 1096, on `Measures to dismantle the heritage of former com- 
munist totalitarian systems'. 25 It identified four principles that should 
guide the transition process: demilitarisation, decentralisation, demon- 
opolisation and debureaucratisation. 26 These general principles were 
accompanied by some more specific recommendations relating to crim- 
inal responsibility for acts carried out under the previous regime; the 
rehabilitation of people convicted of political offences under the former 
regime; the opening of secret service files; the restitution of property 
expropriated under the former regime; and the treatment of people who, 
whilst not the perpetrators of crimes under the former regime, held high 
positions within the communist apparatus and are singled out for spe- 
cial treatment in the new regime (such as restrictions on holding pub- 
lic office). - The `best guarantee' of dismantlement of the former regimes 
was `the profound political, legal and economic reforms in the respective 
countries, leading to the formation of an authentic democratic mentality 
and political culture'. 28 In this, the new Member States were not on their 
own: PACE called on consolidated democracies to `step up' their aid and 
assistance to the emerging democracies. 29 
Resolution 1096 deals both with elements of what political scientists 
would recognise as democratic transition, and what lawyers would rec- 
ognise as transitional justice. The broad theme of democratic transition 
P. Leuprecht, `Innovations in the European System of Human Rights Protection: Is 
Enlargement Compatible with Reinforcement? ', Transnational Law and Contemporary 
Problems 8 (1998) 313. 
E. g. M. Janis, `Russia and the "Legality" of Strasbourg Law', European Journal of 
International Law 8 (1997) 93; R. Kay, `The European Convention on Human Rights and 
the Authority of Law', Connecticut Journal of International Law 8 (1993) 217. 
See J. A. Sweeney, The European Court of Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era: 
Universality in Transition (New York: Routledge, 2011) and J. A. Sweeney, `Divergence 
and Diversity in Post-Communist European Human Rights Cases', Connecticut Journal 
of International Law 21 (2005) 1. 
PACE Resolution 1096 on `Measures to dismantle the heritage of former communist 
totalitarian systems', text adopted by the Assembly on 27 June 1996 (23rd Sitting). 
Mid., para. 5. Ibid., paras. 7-14. 
Ibid., para. 16. Ibid., para. 16. 
'! i 
.r 
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is outside the scope of this chapter, suffice it to say that there is abundant 
literature on the `waves' of democratic transition that have taken place 
throughout history, 30 and competing explanations as to the relation- 
ship between internal (domestic) and external (international) factors in 
successful transitions. Indeed the orthodoxy for much of the twentieth 
century was that internal factors, rather than external factors such as 
pressure from organisations like the Council of Europe, were the most 
significant. " It is therefore worth remembering that, as only one element 
of the Council of Europe, itself an external factor in each state's transi- 
tional process, the impact of the European Court of Human Rights' juris- 
prudence on the ultimate success or otherwise of the Contracting Parties' 
transition should be kept in perspective. 
In addition to being part of the process of democratisation, the more 
specific recommendations of Resolution 1096 can be viewed within the 
paradigm of `transitional justice'. Transitional justice is the `concep- 
tion of justice associated with periods of political change, characterised 
by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predeces- 
sor regimes'. 32 Thus often when we think of the relationship between 
human rights and transitional justice we are concerned with looking at 
attempts to deal with the human rights violations of the previous regime. 
For example Teitel notes that, `the most vigorous enforcement of human 
rights law occurs in transitional periods', citing the creation of ad hoc 
tribunals to prosecute human rights abusers from the Rwandan and 
Bosnian conflicts. 33 Likewise David Little's work on `dealing with human 
rights violations in transitional societies' concentrates on the relationship 
y) In particular, S. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth 
Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 
P. Schmitter, `An Introduction to Southern European Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule: Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey', in G. O'Donnell et al. (eds. ) Transitions 
from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986) 5 and J. C. Pevehouse, Democracy from Above: Regional Organisations and 
Democratization (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 2. 
R. Teitel, `Transitional Justice Genealogy', Harvard Human Rights Law Review 16 (2003) 
69 and see also Teitel's Transitional Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
One might question whether the distinctive policies in Resolution 1096, employed to 
reckon with the past, in fact embody a modified conception of justice or, as Posner and 
Vermeule would argue, can be placed along a spectrum that would see them merely as 
distinctive, albeit fairly extreme, elements of `ordinary justice'. It is the approach of this 
chapter that the measures in Resolution 1096 in fact are measures rooted in transitional 
justice: cf. E. Posner and A. Vermeule, `Transitional justice as Ordinary Justice', Harvard 
Law Review 117 (2004) 761. 
Teitel, Transitional Justice. 228. 
i_ 
33 
FREEDOM OF RELIGION 111 
between the opposing impulses of retribution and reconciliation in deal- 
ing with human rights offenders of the former regime. 34 In the European 
Convention on Human Rights, and in this chapter, this is not what we are 
necessarily looking at - we are looking not at the actions of the former 
regime, but of the current one. Transitional measures taken by the new 
Contracting Parties may themselves impact upon human rights. 
It is important to note that from the text of Resolution 1096, and from 
the general approach to transitional justice of Teitel and others, that spe- 
cial measures justified on grounds related to the particular role of reli- 
gion in transitional societies (or such societies' susceptibility to religious 
extremism) do not, in and of themselves, hold a privileged status as an 
obvious element of the transitional process. Nevertheless, the support 
of the Catholic Church and, in particular, Pope John Paul II, for Lech 
Walesa's `Solidarity' movement in Poland35 shows that as an intermingled 
internal and external factor religion may have played an organic role in at 
least some of the Central and Eastern European transitions. 
The `religion in transition' cases 
In the case of Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova 36 the religious 
context was relevant both to the right at stake, Article 9, and to the reasons 
for restricting it. The Moldovan government argued that their refusal to 
register a religious association that they deemed a schismatic group within 
the Church of Moldova was justified because Moldova `had few strengths 
it could depend on to ensure its continued existence, but one factor con- 
ducive to stability was religion'.; On this basis the government argued, 
and the Court accepted, that `having regard to the circumstances of the 
case' the restriction pursued the legitimate aim of protecting public order 
and public safety. 38 In other words, the transitional context contributed to 
the `legitimacy' of the aim. Nevertheless the European Court of Human 
Rights found that the restriction was not necessary to meet its stated aim, 
and therefore violated Article 9 ECHR. In this part of the judgment the 
Court engaged with the Respondent State's arguments that the measure 
I). Little, `A Different Kind of Justice: Dealing with Human Rights Violations in 
Transitional Societies', Ethics and International Affairs 13 (1999) 65. 
1. Grugel, Democratization: A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2002) 200. 
ECtHR, Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, 13 December 2001 (Appl. no. 
45701/99). 
Ibid., para. 111. Ibid., para. 113. 
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was necessary in order to uphold Moldovan law and Moldovan constitu- 
tional principles; to prevent a threat to territorial integrity; and to protect 
social peace and understanding between believers. 39 The European Court 
did not, at this stage, engage any further with the issue of whether the tran- 
sitional context amplified or even impacted at all on these arguments. 
The Respondent State made similar arguments about the special role 
of religion during democratic transition in the January 2009 case of Holy 
Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan Inokentiy) and 
Others v. Bulgaria. 411 Again, in this case the religious context was relevant 
both to the right invoked and to the reason for restricting it. The case 
concerned a dispute arising from the first democratic Bulgarian govern- 
ment's attempts to replace the Patriarch imposed during the commun- 
ist era (Patriarch Maxim), and the subsequent government's decision to 
reinstate him in order to end the ensuing confusion within the Bulgarian 
Orthodox Church. The government argued before the European Court 
that, `the unity of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was an important 
national goal of historical significance, with ramifications affecting the 
very fabric of the Bulgarian nation and its cultural identity', and therefore 
their reinstatement of Patriarch Maxim was necessary and proportion- 
ate. 41 The European Court of Human Rights disagreed, and found a viola- 
tion of Article 9 ECHR interpreted in the light of Article 11. 
In Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church the European Court 
more explicitly accepted that the transitional context was relevant both 
to the `legitimacy' of the aim and to the `necessity' of the measure. 42 
However, although the Court engaged directly with the arguments about 
the centrality of the issue for the state of Bulgaria, it failed to distinguish 
clearly which legitimate aim or aims were at stake, or to separate their 
identification from answering the questions of necessity and proportion- 
ality. 43 The Court found that: 
[Taking] into account the margin of appreciation ... the 
Bulgarian 
authorities had legitimate reasons to consider some form of action with 
the aim of helping to overcome the conflict in the Church, if possible, or 
limiting its negative effect on public order and legal certainty. 44 
3y Ibid., paras. 123-127. 
ECtHR, Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan Inokentiy) and 
Others v. Bulgaria, 22 January 2009 (Appl. no 412/03 and 35677/04). 
Ibid., para. 143.42 Ibid., para. 145. 
43 Ibid., para. 159.44 Ibid., para. 131. 
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This is intriguing at a doctrinal level because the margin of appreciation is 
normally said to attach to the question of whether a restriction is `neces- 
sary', rather than `legitimate'. 45 Moreover in earlier non-transitional cases 
that Court had explained that the width of the margin of appreciation in 
each case will relate to the legitimate aim put forward by the state. 46 If the 
Court is to apply the margin of appreciation doctrine coherently, it must 
therefore always first identify the aim at stake. 
In Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, and in relation to 
what the Court saw as the issue before it, namely `whether the concrete 
measures chosen by the authorities could be accepted as lawful and neces- 
sary in a democratic society', 47 the Court did not invoke the margin of 
appreciation at all, and simply determined that: 
[The] legitimate aim of remedying the injustices inflicted by the unlawful 
acts of 1992 and the following years, could not warrant the use of State 
power, in 2003,2004 and afterwards, to take sweeping measures, impos- 
ing a return to the status quo ante against the will of a part of the religious 
community. " 
On the one hand both Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Holy Synod 
of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church raise issues about state neutrality in 
religious matters that had arisen in non-transitional cases as well. 49 The 
European Court has consistently held that measures favouring a particu- 
lar leader of a divided religious community or seeking to force the com- 
munity to place itself, against its will, under a single leadership, would 
constitute a violation of Article 9.50 One of the leading cases in this respect 
is also a Bulgarian one: Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria. In this case, as 
we shall see below, the transitional context did not play a role either in 
a; See the discussion in Sweeney, `Divergence and Diversity in Post-Communist European 
Human Rights Cases', 25. 
See, for example, ECtHR, Sunday Times v. UK, 26 April 1979 (Appl. no. 6538/74) para. 59, 
where the European Court compared the aims of `maintaining the authority and impar- 
tiality of the judiciary' and `the protection of health or morals', concluding that there 
would be a narrower margin of appreciation in relation to the former than the latter. 
Ibid., para. 132. 
Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan Inokenti), ) and Others v. 
Bulgaria, para. 138. 
For example in ECtHR, Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, 26 October 2000 (Appl. no. 
30985/96). 
Ibid., para. 78, and ECtHR, Serif v. Greece, 14 December 1999 (Appl. no. 38178/97) para. 
52 and Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, para. 117 and Holy Synod of the 
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the arguments put forward by the Respondent State or in the assess- 
ment of them by the Court. However, and on the other hand, the way in 
which the Respondent States argued their cases in Metropolitan Church of 
Bessarabia and Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church shows that 
there is something else here of relevance to the study of human rights in 
transitional societies. The Respondent States were making a claim that 
certain measures that impact upon freedom of religion are justifiable in 
the particular circumstances of democratic transition because of the spe- 
cial role of religion in fragile democracies. In this respect, they are similar 
to the Al-Nashif case. 
`Legitimacy' and `necessity' distinguished 
The approach of the European Court of Human Rights to the Respondent 
States' claims that the `religion in transition' cases should be treated dif- 
ferently is intriguing. There is a notable absence of consistency in the stage 
at which the transitional context, including the role of religion within it, 
is considered. It is particularly important to develop a coherent approach 
to the relationship between `legitimacy' and `necessity' in cases such as 
these. At this stage there are several routes the Court might take. 
One route is to argue that transitional situations themselves simply do 
not present substantively different issues, and therefore the Respondent 
State's arguments about the special status of religion in the transition 
should be dismissed as normatively unfounded: the impugned measure or 
decision could be neither legitimate nor necessary. This approach can be 
rejected. Convincing work has demonstrated that transitional justice may 
operate, usefully, in a different way to ordinary justice. -" The real ques- 
tion for the European Court is about what it, as an international body, 
and a judicial body, should do about national transitional policies, includ- 
ing those that seek to use religion instrumentally in order to stabilise the 
transition, or those that claim the particular susceptibility of transitional 
societies to religious extremism. 
This is where the second route begins. It might be argued that the Court 
should alter its own conception of justice in cases from transitional states, 
since transitional justice measures always outweigh considerations of 
ordinary justice in transitional democracies. This would recognise that 
Teitel, Transitional Justice, but note that Teitel is concerned about the possible extension 
of transitional justice style thinking to non-transitional contexts; see Teitel, `Transitional 
Justice Genealogy'. 
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the new Contracting Parties are not only undergoing a transition to 
democracy, but also a transition to full compliance with the European 
Convention. The European Court would become an embodiment of an 
international form of transitional justice: the human rights counterpart 
to international criminal responses. 52 The cases in which the transitional 
context goes to the `legitimacy' of a rights-restrictive measure might sug- 
gest that the Court is already doing precisely this. The implication is that 
via the application of a transitional form of justice, certain otherwise 
`illegitimate' actions could be deemed `legitimate'. 
The bestowal of `legitimacy' upon a restrictive measure is significant, 
legally and politically, even where it is found not to be necessary. It is par- 
ticularly questionable when the stated aim is not one that even the most 
ardent advocate of transitional justice would recognise as a common 
transitional policy, such as establishing unity around a state church. As 
suggested above, allowing a margin of appreciation on the legitimacy of 
the restrictive aim is inconsistent with a normal doctrinal understanding 
of the stage at which the margin of appreciation figures in the Court's 
reasoning. Moreover, as demonstrated in the work of Arai-Takahashi, in 
order for the margin of appreciation to operate properly it must be seen 
alongside the question of proportionality, which is clearly more relevant 
to the question of `necessity' than `legitimacy'. 53 Furthermore, and finally, 
it is the argument of this chapter that altering the conception of justice 
and thus legitimacy to be applied to transitional democracies, and con- 
doning less than full compliance with the European Convention, would 
call into question the European Court's commitment to the universality 
of human rights. 
Yet another, third, route would be to argue that although national 
policies founded on transitional justice have a normative pedigree, the 
European Court should not change its own conception of justice. It must 
apply its existing standards in such a way as to respond meaningfully to 
the factual matrix presented by cases emanating from transitional dem- 
ocracies without altering its general approach. The Court may check 
whether a transitional measure is compliant with the rule of law; that, 
in regard to its legitimacy, the transitional measure pursues one of the 
52 In `Transitional Justice Genealogy' Teitel notes the displacement of national justice by 
international justice as a defining feature of post-Second World War transitional justice, 
with the Nuremberg Trials as its most recognised symbol: Teitel, `Transitional Justice 
Genealogy', 70,72. 
53 Y. Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Pro- 
portionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Oxford: Intersentia, 2002). 
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legitimate aims specified in the Convention; and, if it does, it may proceed 
to consider the necessity and proportionality of the measure in the tran- 
sitional context via a detailed and coherent application of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine. 
In this model the transitional context is far more relevant to the basis 
and width of the margin of appreciation than to the conceptual `legitim- 
acy' of the measure. This approach is preferred since, whilst the margin 
of appreciation in respect of necessity allows for some modulation in the 
Court's jurisprudence in recognition of the transitional context (as it does 
in relation to the idiosyncrasies of older Contracting Parties), it does not 
(need to) disturb the universality human rights. ' It is tempting to think of 
this as a transitional margin of appreciation', or similar, but this would be 
misleading because it would imply that the transitional margin is differ- 
ent, conceptually, to the regular margin of appreciation. It is not. Instead, 
the European Court should apply (and sometimes has applied) its regular, 
even formulaic, approach to `religion in transition' cases whilst remain- 
ing fully cognisant of the conceptual relationship between domestic tran- 
sitional justice policies and the international supervision of human rights 
protection. In order to understand this approach, it is now necessary to 
revisit the key cases. 
Revisiting the `religion in transition' cases 
The first stage in any of the transitional cases is to ensure compliance 
with the formal rule of law. Whether a rights-restrictive measure inter- 
feres with Article 9 rights or other Convention rights on the basis of a 
claimed relationship between religion and democratic stability (or sus- 
ceptibility to extremism), the Respondent State must demonstrate that it 
is acting through law. Thus, in the Al-Nashif case introduced above, when 
the European Court examined whether the interference was justified, it 
found that the legal regime surrounding the applicant's deportation did 
not meet the Convention's requirement of lawfulness,;; so it did not need 
to examine whether the interference pursued a legitimate aim or was 
actually proportionate. 56 The impugned actions in the Hasan and Chaush 
J. A. Sweeney, `Margins of Appreciation: Cultural Relativity and the European Court of 
Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era', ICLQ 54(2) (2005) 459. 
Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, para. 128. 
Al-Nashi f v. Bulgaria, para. 129. 
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case also fell at this first hurdle. '' If a rights-restrictive transitional meas- 
ure is to survive scrutiny from the European Court it must, at the very 
least, be `prescribed by law'. 
The second stage is legitimacy. This could be (and often is) a short 
step. For Articles 8-11, the legitimate aims are listed exhaustively in the 
Convention itself. For others that might be relevant in religion cases, such 
as Article 14 or Article 3 of Protocol 1, the Court has fashioned a slightly 
different approach, albeit one which still carries with it an assessment of 
whether the aim of the measure is legitimate. As an aside, it might be 
noted that the Court could perhaps be a little less taciturn in its assimila- 
tion of myriad national policies to the Convention's `legitimate aims'. For 
the approach advocated here it is vital not to give the impression that the 
only reason a measure is held to be `legitimate' is that it was imposed in the 
transitional context. Otherwise the impression could be created that an 
alternative, transitional, form of justice is being applied by the European 
Court. Instead, the national transitional policy should be shown to cor- 
respond clearly to a Convention `legitimate aim', leaving the impact of the 
transitional context as a factor to be considered when assessing the means 
chosen to achieve the aim. Of course if the transitional policy did not 
correspond to a Convention legitimate aim then, whether or not it might 
have some stabilising effect in a fragile democracy, it would be in conflict 
with the Convention. By joining the Council of Europe, and signing and 
ratifying the ECHR, it may be that states have thereby disbarred them- 
selves from employing some transitional policies, in favour of a `human 
rights based approach' to transition. 
The third and most important stage is necessity. It is here where the Court 
can engage with the question of whether a purportedly transitional meas- 
ure is widely recognised as pursuing a necessary task in the transitional 
process. If not then there is no reason to treat it differently to any other 
rights-restrictive measure when it comes to the basis or width of the margin 
of appreciation. This is particularly important in the religion cases since we 
have established that `stabilising the state around an established church', or 
similar, is not widely recognised as a classic transitional policy. 
Where a rights-restrictive practice, which is purportedly justified by 
reference to the transitional context, is to be examined then the Court 
should, in the first place, enforce the Convention in such a way as to pro- 
tect against `naked, bad faith abuse of power'. 58 However much a state 
Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, para. 86. 
P. Mahoney, `Marvellous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism', Human 
Rights Law journal 19(1) (1998) 1,4. 
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stressed a special relationship between religion and democratic transition 
in the context of a case brought against it, a measure that amounted to an 
unmitigated abuse of power could never be justified. There would be no 
question of it falling within the state's margin of appreciation since the 
margin only allows variations in how, and not whether, to comply with the 
Convention. This is the first, but not the only, level of protection offered 
by the Convention. It is (only) at a second level, when a rights-restrictive 
transitional measure is imposed in `good faith', for example within the 
wider context of democratic consolidation, that the margin of appreci- 
ation should be considered. -9 
The key here is that only a rights-restrictive transitional measure that 
contributed towards democratic consolidation could benefit from a mar- 
gin of appreciation. 60 To suggest otherwise would be to radically expand 
the scope of the margin of appreciation doctrine, provide inadequate 
supervision of the new Contracting Parties' democratic transition, and 
undermine the rule of law. 
This aligns neatly with the approach taken in PACE Resolution 1096 
where, in an effort to avoid complaints reaching the Strasbourg institu- 
tions, PACE cautioned that: 
[A] democratic state based on the rule of law must, in dismantling the 
heritage of former communist totalitarian systems, apply the procedural 




On democracy in the ECHR, see ECtHR, United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, 
30 January 1998 (Appl. no. 19392/92) para. 45, where the European Court held that 
`Democracy is without doubt a fundamental feature of the European public order ... 
That 
is apparent ... 
firstly, from the Preamble to the Convention ... 
[The Court] has pointed out 
several times that the Convention was designed to maintain and promote the ideals and 
values of a democratic society ... 
In addition, Articles 8,9,10 and II of the Convention 
require that interference with the exercise of the rights they enshrine must be assessed 
by the yardstick of what is "necessary in a democratic society". The only type of necessity 
capable of justifying an interference with any of those rights is, therefore, one which may 
claim to spring from "democratic society". Democracy thus appears to be the only pol- 
itical model contemplated by the Convention and, accordingly, the only one compatible 
with it'. However note the contrasting views expressed in A. Mowbray, `The Role of the 
European Court of Human Rights in the Promotion of Democracy', Public Law (1999) 
703 and C. Gearty, `Democracy and Human Rights in the European Court of Human 
Rights: A Critical Appraisal', Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 51 (2000) 381 and see also 
S. Marks, `The European Convention on Human Rights and its "Democratic Society"', 
British Yearbook of International Law (1995) 209 and R. O'Connell, `Towards a Stronger 
Concept of Democracy in the Strasbourg Convention', European Human Rights Law 
Review (2006) 281 and S. Wheatley, `Minorities under the ECHR and the Construction of 
41 a Democratic Society"', Public Law (2007) 770. 
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then be no better than the totalitarian regime which is to be dismantled. 
A democratic state based on the rule of law has sufficient means at its 
disposal to ensure that the cause of justice is served and the guilty are 
punished ... 
A state based on the rule of law can also defend itself against 
a resurgence of the communist totalitarian threat, since it has ample 
means at its disposal which do not conflict with human rights and the rule 
of law. ' 
There is reason to suppose that the European Court itself is sympathetic 
to this approach. A point of principle can be extracted from the judgment 
in the Holy Synod case: that transitional societies' common need to rem- 
edy unlawful acts of the past cannot justify, in a democratic society, dis- 
proportionate state action and further unlawful acts. 62 
As the Court examines the question of necessity in the transitional 
cases, it should encourage and scrutinise arguments about the basis and, 
separately, the width of the margin of appreciation. The basis of the mar- 
gin may relate to the robustness of the domestic mechanisms for verifying 
the material facts of the case, or to the policy expertise and legitimacy of 
elected legislatures. The width of the margin in particular cases will be 
tied to some combination of various factors, including the right at stake, 
the way that it is invoked, and the legitimate aim the restriction pursues. 63 
It is conceded that for some commentators the width of the margin of 
appreciation is determined too haphazardly to play the role suggested in 
this chapter. Nevertheless, the various factors that are identified as com- 
monly playing a role in determining its width can, it is submitted, provide 
a useful framework on which to hang discussion of whether a rights- 
restrictive measure in the `religion in transition' case ultimately discloses 
a violation of the Convention. 
hl PACE Resolution 1096, para. 4 (emphasis added). 
ECtHR, Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, para. 142. 
On the width of the margin of appreciation, including those with a critical perspective 
on the doctrine itself, such as Jones and Hutchinson, see: Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine, 206 and E. Brems, `The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the 
Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights', Zeitschrift fur Auslandisches offen- 
thiches recht and volkerrecht 56 (1996) 240,256-293 and M. Hutchinson, `The Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine in the European Court of Human Rights', ICLQ 48 (1999) 638, 
640 and T. Jones, `The Devaluation of Human Rights Under the European Convention', 
Public Law (1995) 430,438 and Mahoney, `Marvellous Richness of Diversity', 5 and 
J. Schokkenbroek, `The Basis, Nature and Application of the Margin of Appreciation 
Doctrine in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights', Human Rights Law 
Journal 19(1) (1998) 30,34 and J. A. Sweeney, 'A "Margin of Appreciation" in the Internal 
Market: Lessons from the European Court of Human Rights', Legal Issues of Economic 
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If relevant and sufficient reasons were provided that such a rights- 
restrictive measure had support from the national legislature, as an appro- 
priate response to that state's distinctive experience of transition, this 
would seem to be a reasonable place to recognise a margin of appreciation 
within which different transitional states might defensibly come to dif- 
ferent conclusions. 64 Naturally, however, there would still be `a European 
supervision'' hand in hand' with this. `" The point is not that the margin 
would allow states to diverge from the standards of the Convention, but 
that each national response to democratic transition is not expected to be 
identical. 
Thus, the approach advocated here does not demand that transitional 
measures per se should benefit from a wide margin of appreciation, but 
that the transitional context provides further data relevant to the identi- 
fication of the existing rationales for its basis and width on a case by case 
basis. 
The application of this approach to the `religion in transition' (and 
other transitional) cases is advantageous because there are at least two 
other techniques open to the European Court to respond to distinct and 
especially difficult issues arising in relation to the role of religion in the 
transitional context. These techniques, derogations and invocation of the 
idea of self-defending (or militant) democracy, are considered more fully 
elsewhere in this volume, thus the examination here will be both brief and 
pinned to the religious context. 
Derogations 
First, we know that in emergency situations, the Court has allowed a wide 
margin of appreciation under Article 15 ECHR. " Article 9 is, to use a 
67 double-negative, not a non-derogable right. If a transitional democracy 
ECtHR, Zdanoka v. Latvia [GC], 16 March 2006 (Appl. no. 58278/00) para. 134, discussed 
further below. 
ECtHR, Handysidc v. UK, 7 December 1976 (Appl. no. 5493/72) para. 49. 
See R. Higgins, `Derogations Under Human Rights Treaties', BYIL 48 (1976-1977) 281 and 
Jones, `The Devaluation of Human Rights under the European Convention'; M. O'Boyle, 
`The Margin of Appreciation and Derogation under Article 15: Ritual Incantation or 
Principle', Human Rights Law Journal 19(1) (1998) 23, who all note that the margin is 
particularly, even unnecessarily, wide in relation to the existence of a public emergency. 
Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation, 94, would argue that, in contrast to the 
manifestation of religion, the internal aspect of it may in fact be `considered' non- 
derogable. 
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had to take measures under Article 15, then the Court's existing juris- 
prudence would apply. It might be argued that where a rights-restrictive 
measure, including a measure restrictive of Article 9, is required in order 
to capitalise on the alleged stabilising effect of religion in a particular 
society (or its susceptibility to religious extremism), the Contracting 
Party would have to file a derogation and consequently to show compli- 
ance with the conditions of Article 15. 
This is unsatisfactory from two perspectives. First, it would be too high 
a threshold for the rights-restrictive measure to pass, and it might result 
in the Contracting Party not being able to take steps that are necessary. 
Second, if the first problem were to be remedied by conceding a wide mar- 
gin of appreciation on transitional grounds, either on the existence of an 
emergency situation or the necessity of the measures taken in response 
to it, the new Contracting Parties would be allowed to evade the scrutiny 
of the Court too easily and the role of Article 15 would become warped. 
Thus, although the possibility of a valid derogation in respect of meas- 
ures on religious grounds remains, it would be in only the most serious 
of circumstances and could not be responsive enough to the transitional 
context without compromising the integrity of Article 15. 
This advice is not as necessary in relation to two of the international 
comparators because although Article 4 ICCPR and Article 27 ACHR 
authorise derogations in times of public emergency, both prohibit dero- 
gation from the right to freedom of conscience and religion. The ACHPR 
does not contain a derogation clause at all, leading to some debate as to 
whether the system adequately distinguishes between peacetime limita- 
tions and derogations in times of war or other public emergency. " To the 
extent that a clear distinction might emerge, the suggestion here would 
be that derogations would be useful in `religion in transition' cases, again, 
only in quite extreme circumstances. 
Self-defending democracy 
Second, and without resorting to a derogation, a Respondent State in the 
European system whose democratic transition was under real threat of 
failure due to anti-democratic religious forces might be able to persuade 
the European Court to accept the notion of self-defending (or militant) 
democracy in order to justify rights-restrictive measures. In a series of 
hK See Allo, `Derogations or Limitations? 
122 J. A. SWEENEY 
cases, the European Court has accepted that democracies whose exist- 
ence is under imminent threat may take pre-emptive measures against 
the forces working against it, for example by dissolving political parties 
(albeit subject to strict scrutiny). 
The case of Refah Partisi v. Turkey69 is perhaps now the most notorious 
of the cases on self-defending democracy. Here, the Court did not find a 
violation of the Convention when a major political party with around four 
million members, which was already part of a coalition government and 
which was likely to form a government after the next general election, was 
dissolved because of its aim of imposing Sharia law on Turkey. The Court 
held that a political party that was animated by the moral values imposed 
by a religion cannot be regarded as `intrinsically inimical' to the funda- 
mental principles of democracy. '° However, Sharia was, bluntly, held by 
the Chamber and Grand Chamber to be `incompatible with the funda- 
mental principles of democracy'. '' Thus, although this case is steeped 
in religious contextual factors, the reason for restriction was tied to the 
preservation of democracy. Moreover, although it can be argued that 
the historical evolution of the idea of self-defending democracy suggests 
that it is a species of transitional justice, this does not seem to be how the 
European Court used it in Refah Partisi, since Turkey has been a member 
of the Council of Europe since 1949.72 
The limits of self-defending democracy in general, and in the European 
jurisprudence, are still unclear, and there are risks of abuse. '] The value of 
its continued use as a basis for the European Court's reasoning on peace- 
time limitations is questionable. Given this, there is fruitful debate to be 




Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) v. Turkey. 
Ibid., para. 100. Ibid., para. 123. 
Council of Europe, `The Council of Europe in Brief - 47 Countries, one Europe', www. 
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the one hand, and the judicial application of transitional justice on the other. Although 
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P. Macklem, `Militant Democracy, Legal Pluralism, and the Paradox of Self- 
Determination', International Journal of Constitutional Law 4(3) (2006) 488,492. 
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from the new Contracting Parties. 74 The clearest example of how it might 
look was the decision of the Grand Chamber in Zdanoka v. Latvia. In 
this case the Grand Chamber upheld a restriction on the political activ- 
ities of a member of the Communist Party of Latvia, in order to defend 
Latvia against the resurgence of communism during the transitional 
phase. The applicant was prohibited from standing for election to the 
Latvian national parliament in 2002, as a result of her active participation 
in the Communist Party of Latvia after 13 January 1991 (the date they had 
launched an attempted coup). 75 Despite citing Refah Partisi and confirm- 
ing `the legitimacy of the concept of a "democracy capable of defending 
itself "', 711 the substance of the judgment owes a lot more to the Court's 
appraisal of the transitional context. 77 The threat was of a very different 
scale to the threat in Refah Partisi: the election of one person as opposed 
to the election of a government. Indeed it might have been better not to 
have decided it as a self-defending democracy case at all. 
The European Court's approach to self-defending democracy is rele- 
vant to the `religion in transition' cases only where the religious organisa- 
tion subjected to a rights-restrictive measure also has an anti-democratic 
agenda, and passes the Refah Partisi threshold of posing an imminent dan- 
ger. 78 Where the religious organisation has no anti-democratic agenda, 
the fact that restricting or prohibiting its activities might be conducive 
to transitional stability cannot be justified using this body of law or the- 
ory. The Refah Partisi and 2danoka line of jurisprudence would not shed 
any further light on Al-Nashif or Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox 
Church, although it could potentially have played a role in Metropolitan 
Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova. 
The Inter-American Commission on human rights does not seem 
to have been influenced by the European Court's reasoning in Refah 
Partisi, 79 nor does it generally recognise the concept of self-defending 
See Chapter 7, this volume. See also, P. Harvey, `Militant Democracy and the European 
Convention on Human Rights', European Law Review 29(3) (2004) 407 and R. Teitel, 
`Militating Democracy: Comparative Constitutional Perspectives', Michigan Journal of 
International Law 29 (2007) 49. 
2danoka v. Latvia [GC], para. 22. 
Ibid., para. 100. _. Ibid., paras. 133-135. 
One might question whether the blunt equation of Sharia with wholesale incompatibility 
with the Convention is an appropriately thorough methodology to apply when examin- 
ing the democratic credentials of a religiously affiliated political party, but the validity 
of the logical step remains. For a critical reading of the Court's assessment of Sharia in 
Refah see McGoldrick, `Accommodating Muslims in Europe', 603. 
The Dissenting Opinion of Commissioner Zalaquett in IAComHR, Statehood Solidarity 
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democracy. The Inter-American Court has been critical of the European 
approach and, in Yatama v. Nicaragua, it implied that the European 
Court had `discounted' the importance of political parties as essential 
forms of association for the development and strengthening of dem- 
ocracy by its judgment in Refah Partisi. 80 The African Commission on 
Human and Peoples' Rights does not seem to have pursued the thesis of 
self-defending democracy either. Given the inherent risks of the concept, 
this is no bad thing. 
Conclusion: religion, transition and universality 
In the introduction it was suggested that this chapter would attempt to 
construct a legally sound and theoretically robust approach to the `reli- 
gion in transition' cases, which also fully respects the experiences of 
transitional democracies. In this chapter, we have seen how the existing 
jurisprudence of the Court can be used to respond to the complex fac- 
tual matrix of the `religion in transition' cases, without the Court alter- 
ing its own conception of justice. A thorough approach to prescription by 
law, pursuit of a legitimate aim, and discussion of necessity and propor- 
tionality via the margin of appreciation doctrine, yields workable results. 
The main difference between the approach advocated here and `business 
as usual' is that it not only recognises, but also strongly recommends, a 
space for meaningful engagement with the relationship between national 
transitional justice policies and international human rights. 
Although this space, or margin, would allow a more detailed engage- 
ment with the realities of transitional democracies, it remains important 
not to cast the European Court in the role of a dispenser of transitional 
justice itself. It was suggested above that if the Court were to hold that the 
transitional context could render certain otherwise `illegitimate' meas- 
ures `legitimate' it would be doing just this. 
The approach advocated here would strongly caution against allow- 
ing a margin of appreciation in relation to legitimate aims not only on 
doctrinal grounds related to the proper role of the margin, but also on 
two related normative grounds: first that the European Court, as an inter- 
national human rights court, should not explicitly apply transitional just- 
ice itself; and, second, that this is because, if it did so, it would undermine 
the Rcfah Partisi case, but on the question of electoral rights more generally and not on 
the specific issue of self-defending democracy. 
811 IACtHR, Yatama v. Nicaragua, 23 June 2005 (Series C no. 127) para. 215. 
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the universality of human rights. This second, normative, point would 
apply equally to the international comparators, whether they do or do not 
recognise the margin of appreciation as a judicial tool (and most do not). ' 
Translated across to the international comparators, the point would be 
that any `flexibility' in the system should relate not to the conceptual legit- 
imacy of the aim put forward by the transitional state, but to the necessity 
of the impugned restrictive measure. Again, to do otherwise, and for the 
judges of the European Court to dispense transitional justice themselves, 
would be injurious to the universality of human rights. 
Ironically enough, in the early days of the Council of Europe's enlarge- 
ment, similar concerns were expressed about allowing a margin of appre- 
ciation to the new Contracting Parties. ' Thus, one might argue that the 
approach for Europe recommended here, which allows for discussion of 
the transitional context via necessity and the margin of appreciation rather 
than on the question of the legitimacy of the aim, is no better a guaran- 
tee against undermining the universality of human rights. Nevertheless, 
the hypothesis on which the approach to the `religion in transition' cases 
advocated here is based is that because (when it is correctly applied), the 
margin of appreciation attaches to the reasons given for a measure being 
necessary, rather than to the definition of the right in question" (or to the 
Ni In HRC (United Nations Human Rights Committee), Hertzberg, Mansson, Nikula and 
Putkonen v. Finland, 2 April 1982 (Communication No. R. 14/61, UN Doc. Supp. No. 40 
(A/37/40) CCPR/C/15/D/61 /1979) para. 10.3 the Human Rights Committee of the ICCPR 
recognised a 'margin of discretion' on moral issues, but then appeared rather critical of 
the doctrine in made use of the margin of appreciation doctrine, but in HRC, Länsman et 
al v. Finland, 22 November 1996 (Communication No. 511/1992, UN Doc. CCPR/C/52/ 
D/511/1992) para. 9.4. On the ACHR see Chapter 10, this volume, noting that whilst the 
Inter-American Court has once made reference to it in an Advisory Opinion, it has not 
since developed this line of reasoning. By contrast the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples' Rights explicitly recognised that the margin of appreciation informs the 
African Charter in AfComHPR, Prince v. South Africa, 31 October 2007 (Communique 
255/2002), reprinted in African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 'Eighteenth 
Activity Report', presented at the Sixth Ordinary Session of the African Union Executive 
Council 24-31 January 2005, EX. CL/167 (VI). 
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Court of Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era', discussing inter alia comments made 
in A. Lester, 'Universality versus Subsidiarity: A Reply', European Human Rights Law 
Review 1 (1998) 73,76; P. Mahoney, `Speculating on the Future of the Reformed European 
Court of Human Rights', Human Rights Law Journal 20 (1999) 1,3. 
J. Gerards and H. Senden, 'The Structure of Fundamental Rights and the European Court 
of Human Rights', International Journal of Constitutional Law 7(4) (2009) 619, especially 
at 647; a notable exception to this is the judgment in ECtHR, Vo v. France [GG], 8 Jul), 
2004 (Appl. no. 53924/00) para. 82, where the European Court recognised a margin of 
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`legitimacy' of the restrictive aim), it does not undermine the conceptual 
universality of human rights. 
The approach recommended here is important because in the three 
principal cases examined, Al-Nashif, Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia 
and Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, the European Court 
paid only lip service to the conceptual validity of domestic transitional 
policies when it held that the measures could be `legitimate'. On the cru- 
cial question of whether the measure was necessary, the Court largely 
ignored the Respondent States' arguments from a transitional perspective. 
On the one hand this aloofness from the realities of the new Contracting 
Parties could be described as `dynamics of condescension' from Western 
to Eastern Europe. 84 If there is a good transitional reason why Bulgarian 
Muslims are more susceptible to extremism than Muslims in other states, 
then it should be put to the Court. If not, there is no guarantee that sus- 
picion of Muslim preachers such as Al-Nashif is not motivated by sect- 
arian concerns emanating from the Balkans' difficult recent history. On 
the other hand, the Court might have been too generous by finding that 
the measures in Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Holy Synod of the 
Bulgarian Orthodox Church were perfectly `legitimate', but only lacking 
in `necessity', since the Court failed to challenge whether the stated aim of 
the measures was generally thought of as a useful transitional policy. 
The approach advocated here calls for international human rights 
enforcement bodies, including the European Court, to engage far more 
robustly with the difficult question of when, and in what circumstances, 
national transitional policies that might secure peace or democratic con- 
solidation are trumped by international human rights concerns. Judge 
Bonello identified the existence of this dilemma in his dissenting Opinion 
in Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, when he argued that the 
Court had `canonised' the relevant Convention rights whilst `discount- 
ing' the values of peace and reconciliation. These values were, he argued, 
`at least' equally invaluable. SS Whether his view that, in the particu- 
lar context, discrimination against Jews and Roma did not violate the 
Convention is accepted, at least he identified the crux of the issue. 
appreciation on the issue of when the right to life begins. See Gerards and Senden, ibid., 
648; Sweeney, `A "Margin of Appreciation" in the Internal Market', 39. 
M. Dembour and M. Krzyzanowska-Mierzewska, `Ten Years On: The Voluminous and 
Interesting Polish Case Law', European Human Rights Law Review 5 (2005) 517. 
ECtHR, Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], 22 December 2009 (27996/06 
and 34836/06) dissenting Opinion of Judge Bonello. 
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The outcome of the three cases naturally depends on both the approach 
to transition and to the approach of the European Court to religion. The 
Al-Nashif case is potentially the odd one out here since it dealt with the 
presumed susceptibility of one religion, Islam, to extremist influences 
during the transition. The Court did not strictly need to determine the 
veracity of this presumption in order to decide whether there had been 
a violation of Article 8. Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Holy 
Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church have in common that the rights- 
restrictive measure was based upon a presumed beneficial role of having 
a stable state church during periods of democratic transition. In its sum- 
mary determination that the measure was `legitimate' the Court did not 
sufficiently question whether this presumption was valid either. 
One might even be slightly surprised by the Court's relatively easy 
acceptance that these measures were `legitimate': Teitel has argued that 
the European Court has pursued an `extreme concept of secularism' as 
an element of its vision of a democratic society, 86 citing Sahin v. Turkey in 
this regard (where the Grand Chamber upheld a prohibition upon wear- 
ing Islamic headscarves at university). The Chamber decision in Lautsi 
v. Italy, in which the Chamber found that displaying a crucifix in Italian 
schools violated the Convention rights of secular parents, seemed to fol- 
low in this line. 87 However, the decision of the Grand Chamber to reverse 
that finding, noted in the introduction above, certainly makes the Court's 
position more ambiguous. 88 Of course, since the European Court found 
that the measures were not necessary, the conclusion (if not all the rea- 
soning) in both Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Holy Synod of the 
Bulgarian Orthodox Church would also broadly conform to the pattern 
seen in Sahin and Lautsi. In this way, the conclusions in Metropolitan 
Church of Bessarabia and Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church 
might owe as much to an emerging secular orthodoxy as they do to a lack 
of engagement with the relationship between domestic transitional just- 
ice measures and international human rights. To this extent, it is perhaps 
less likely that the other international mechanisms would be drawn down 
this route in their own `religion in transition' jurisprudence, and might 
even be more receptive to the broad approach outlined here (minus expli- 
cit invocation of the margin of appreciation doctrine). 
Teitel, `Militating Democracy: Comparative Constitutional Perspectives', 59 - discuss- 
ing the judgment in Sahin v. Turkey. 
ECtHR, Lautsi v. Italy, 3 November 2009 (Appl. no. 30814/06). 
ECtHR, Lautsi v. Italy [GC), 18 March 2011 (Appl. no. 30814/06). 
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The relationship between an international human rights court's 
responses to cases from a transitional context and the universality of 
human rights is a fertile area of further research. One might argue that it 
is the universality of human rights, rather than the normative pedigree of 
transitional justice, which is the greatest brake on such courts' approval 
of national transitional policies via alterations of their own standards of 
justice. The extent to which the margin of appreciation in the European 
system really does square the circle, by responding meaningfully to the 
transitional context without compromising the universality of human 
rights, is a demanding and crucial question but, for the purposes of this 
chapter, it will have to remain only partially articulated. "y 
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